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ABSTRACT
Intellectual Property (IP) theft costs semiconductor design com-
panies billions of dollars every year. Unauthorized IP copies start
from reverse engineering the given chip. Existing techniques to
protect against IP theft aim to hide the IC’s functionality, but fo-
cus on manipulating the HDL descriptions. We propose TAO as a
comprehensive solution based on high-level synthesis to raise the
abstraction level and apply algorithmic obfuscation automatically.
TAO includes several transformations that make the component
hard to reverse engineer during chip fabrication, while a key is
later inserted to unlock the functionality. Finally, this is a promis-
ing approach to obfuscate large-scale designs despite the hardware
overhead needed to implement the obfuscation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Hardware→ Electronic design automation; • Security and pri-
vacy→ Hardware reverse engineering;
KEYWORDS
High-Level Synthesis, Algorithm-Level Obfuscation, Reverse Engi-
neering, IP theft.
1 INTRODUCTION
The cost of manufacturing an Integrated Circuit (IC) is growing as
technology scales, limiting the number of companies that can afford
the billion dollar manufacturing foundries [6]. Many companies are
thus becoming fab-less, outsourcing ICmanufacturing to third-party
foundries [7]. This creates security issues: a rogue in the potentially
untrusted foundry can access the chip design and reverse engineer
the functionality to steal the Intellectual Property (IP) [5].
Several techniques have been proposed to thwart reverse engi-
neering of an IC at an untrusted foundry. Split manufacturing splits
the computing resources from the interconnections, with the two
parts fabricated in different foundries. Logic obfuscation has been
extensively investigated for this purpose as well [14]. The designer
adds additional inputs and modules to the design to hide the correct
functionality, while a locking key (unknown to the foundry and
written later in a tamper-proof memory) activates the IC. With the
increasing complexity of ICs, designers are migrating to high-level
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Figure 1: IC design flow; red artifacts show IC reverse engi-
neering. TAO extends HLS with obfuscation using a key.
synthesis (HLS) to automate the design process [11]. While one can
apply logic obfuscation on the generated netlist [13], more robust
solutions can be applied directly at the algorithm level.
Algorithm-level obfuscation aims at developing anti-reverse
engineering techniques based on the characteristics of the algorithm
the different steps in HLS. We aim at raising the abstraction level
of RTL obfuscation by embracing a security-aware HLS flow to
generate obfuscated designs by construction.
Techniques for Algorithm Obfuscation (TAO) start from a high-
level description of the functionality in C language, and use HLS
methods to produce the corresponding obfuscated RTL description.
This is achieved by obfuscating the HLS results or the generated
RTL description. TAO extends HLS algorithms to obfuscate the
most sensitive details of an algorithm. TAO presents techniques
that obfuscate the information that comes from the specification
(e.g., constant values, loop bounds) and the information generated
by HLS (e.g., control states, used and unused data path resources,
execution latency). TAO can obfuscate complex functions as part
of a comprehensive HLS-based obfuscation design flow.
1.1 Related Work
IC counterfeiting is a critical issue for fabless companies since they
may lose billions of dollars for IP theft and overselling [5]. So,
several IP protection techniques have been proposed at different
stages of the design process. Some methods focus on modifying
the design before fabrication with hardware watermarking [1] or
leveraging intrinsic hardware properties of the device with Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [17]. However, these solutions require
an intimate knowledge of the target technology and the back-end
tool-chain. Split manufacturing separates the fabrication of the
interconnections from the rest of the chip [8]. However, the process
requires a 2.5D integration technology. Another solution hides the
IC function by adding extra gates to the gate-level netlist and uses
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a secret key to activate the IC [14],[10]. High-level transformations
have been already proposed but only to obfuscate DSP circuits [9].
SAT-based attacks can extract these keys [16, 18]. In [13], the
authors propose RTL hardening techniques by adding extra con-
nections among the functional units. While this approach is more
potent than gate-level methods, constant values and branches are
challenging to obfuscate since the design is already optimized. For
instance, interconnections between resources andmultiplexers have
been sized based on the given precision. However, this reveals in-
formation on their range. Since TAO applies at a higher level of
abstraction, it masks sensitive details of the algorithm by hiding
sensitive constants and encrypting them during the front-end with
a limited overhead. Key management is another aspect of algo-
rithmic obfuscation. Many companies are proposing solutions to
store keys in tamper-proof memories (e.g., one-time-programmable
memories) off-chip. These approaches are complementing this work
wherein TAO stores the keys in on-chip tamper-proof non-volatile
memories.
1.2 Contributions
HLS solutions to obfuscate an IC are unavailable. However, this
is a promising approach to broaden the set of obfuscations and
to obfuscate complex designs. For instance, in TAO, we propose
obfuscations both at the front-end level and during HLS. Working
at the HLS level allows us to remove the sensitive algorithmic
information and integrate it within the key. The main contributions
of TAO are as follows:
• TAO considers the untrusted foundry as the adversary (Sec-
tion 3.1);
• TAO is a HLS-based design flow for algorithmic obfuscation
that starts directly from C code (Section 3.2);
• TAO uses a set of obfuscation techniques that span all the
HLS steps (Section 3.3);
• TAO shows how to manage the locking key (Section 3.4).
1.3 Roadmap
After presenting the model of the components that we aim at pro-
tecting (Section 2), we present the TAO approach for algorithm-level
obfuscation, showing how it is implemented in a HLS flow (Sec-
tion 3). In Section 4, we evaluate the area and performance overhead
for the TAO obfuscation techniques and present a validation of the
obfuscated designs.
2 DESIGN MODEL
TAO targets ICs generated using HLS. State-of-the-art HLS tools
rely on the Finite-State Machine with Data path (FSMD) model [2].
The controller is a finite state machine (FSM) that determines which
operations execute in each clock cycle. The controller sends control
signals to trigger the operators and the interconnection in the data
path to perform the computation. These two parts are coupled, and
both are required to extract IC’s function.
The HLS flow is shown in Figure 2. It interfaces with state-of-the-
art compilers (e.g., GCC or LLVM) to parse the input C code, apply
compiler optimizations, and extract an intermediate representation
(IR) [11]. The HLS steps work on this IR as follows. Scheduling
selects the resources and memories and determines the operations
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Figure 2: HLS flow extended with key-based obfuscations.
to execute in each clock cycle. During module binding, operations
scheduled in different clock cycles are assigned to reuse resources.
Temporary values crossing the clock boundaries are mapped to
different registers during register binding [15]. The penultimate
step in HLS is interconnection binding, where the different resources
are interconnected. Ultimately, the control signals are identified and
the controller is generated during controller synthesis. The output
is an RTL design ready for logic synthesis.
To protect the intellectual property (IP) of an algorithm, we
identify the following elements to protect via obfuscation:
• arithmetic operations: The designer aims at obfuscating the
Data FlowGraph (DFG), i.e., which and howmany operations
are executed, together with their dependencies.
• constant values (e.g., coefficients, loop bounds) reveal details
of the algorithm on one hand and enable further logic-level
optimizations on the other. The optimization results can leak
information on the operations manipulating these values.
• control flow represents the sequence of FSM states traversed
during the execution for the given inputs. It represents pro-
tocol implementations in control-dominated applications.
The elements are connected because leaking information on one
set of elements can aid recover details on the others.
3 HIGH-LEVEL SYNTHESIS TECHNIQUES
FOR ALGORITHM OBFUSCATION (TAO)
3.1 TAO Threat Model: The Untrusted Foundry
3.1.1 Untrusted Foundry’s Objective. The main goal of the rogue
in the untrusted foundry is to identify the functionality of the IC.
In particular, he or she aims at recovering the correct sequence of
states executed by the controller, along with the signals provided to
the data path (operations to execute, registers, and interconnections)
in each given clock cycle. This gives the foundry the possibility of
reproducing the IC, thus misappropriating the IP.
3.1.2 Foundry’s Capabilities. The untrusted foundry has full
access to the GDSII file (i.e., the layout) of the obfuscated circuit gen-
erated from the synthesis output using physical design tools. From
the GDSII file, we assume that the foundry can reverse engineer the
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types of modules used in the design (i.e., registers, functional units,
interconnection elements) and can identify the operations executed
by each functional unit. The foundry can also perform simulations
with different input and lock key values to extract information from
the circuit that can help reconstruct the functionality. However,
the untrusted foundry does not have access to the correct key or a
functioning unlocked IC.
3.1.3 Target of the Attacks. Low volume customers who build
sensitive designs (e.g. US DOD) are typically targeted by untrusted
foundries under pressure from their government. Until recently,
IBM was maintaining the trusted foundry for the US government.
Once it got acquired by Global Foundries owned by a foreign entity,
there is no trusted foundry anymore.
3.2 TAO Approach
TAO extends the traditional HLS flow to obfuscate the IC function-
ality and make reverse engineering and hence the IP theft difficult.
Since an HLS-generated component requires interaction between
the data path and the controller, TAO is a comprehensive solution
for algorithm obfuscation embracing all steps in HLS.
3.2.1 Front-end. A locking key K is generated by the designer to
activate the IC, as shown in Fig. 1. The IR generated and optimized
during the HLS front-end is processed to determine the working
keyW used for obfuscation. The size of the working key depends
on the complexity of the algorithm to protect. We assign a fixed
number of key bits to obfuscate each constant, each basic block (to
obfuscate the DFG and the FSM states resulting from its scheduling),
and each control branch. After compiler parsing and optimization
steps, TAO extracts and obfuscates the constants (see Section 3.3.2)
to prevent HLS optimizations based on their bit-width that may
reveal sensitive information.
3.2.2 Mid-level. The IR is input to the HLS. The data path and
controller of each sub-function are obfuscated to hide the execution
of the correct algorithm. TAO obfuscates each control branch (see
Section 3.3.3) and basic block (see Section 3.3.4). In case of a condi-
tional jump, TAO masks the result of the condition with a key bit
that obfuscates the target state. The output and next-state functions
of the controller are masked with key bits to obfuscate the correct
transitions while maintaining logical but incorrect execution flows
in case of wrong locking keys. For each basic block, TAO creates
several DFG variants to thwart identification of the arithmetic oper-
ations and dependencies. In the data path, we add extra connections
among functional units and registers to implement several valid
DFG variants. The choice of the variants is encoded by the key bits
assigned to the basic block.
3.2.3 Back-end. This step generates the register transfer level
(RTL) description and the logic for key management of the obfus-
cated design. The component will feature an input port to load the
locking key, while the working key is stored internally and derived
from the input locking key. We discuss how to manage the case
where we need more working key bits than the available locking
key bits (Section 3.4).
3.3 TAO Obfuscation Techniques
In this section, we present the techniques implemented in the front-
end and the intermediate phases.
3.3.1 Creation of the Call Graph and Key Apportionment. TAO
starts by applying compiler and HLS transformations to the IR,
including function inlining and loop optimizations. For this, TAO
extracts the call graph to figure out the list and hierarchy of func-
tions implemented [11]. Other information consists of the number
of basic blocks1 and the resulting control flows represented as a
Control Flow Graph (CFG). By analyzing this information, TAO
determines the number of working key bitsW needed to obfuscate
the algorithm:
W = Numi f + Numconst ∗C +
BB∑
i=0
Bi (1)
where Numi f and Numconst are the number of branches and con-
stants, respectively. C is the number of key bits assigned to imple-
ment each constant and Bi is the number of key bits assigned to
the basic block BBi .
3.3.2 Extraction of Constants. Constants are a requisite part
of the specification and may disclose sensitive information about
the implemented algorithm. Consider a digital filter whose coeffi-
cients are stored in an on-IC memory external to the component
and accessed through a memory interface. The loop bounds may
reveal the number of taps in the filter. TAO removes such sensitive
constants from the data path and use them as locking key bits.
HLS tools optimize the data path based on the data bit-width to
reduce the IC cost [4]. However, using the minimum number of
bits to represent a constant divulges information about its range.
TAO pre-defines the number of bits C to implement all constants
of the function. This may rule out subsequent logic optimizations
(e.g., constant propagation and trimming). Each constant V pi of the
input algorithm is obfuscated as follows:
V ei = V
p
i ⊕ Ki (2)
where V ei is the obfuscated value stored in the micro-architecture,
while Ki is a C-bit signal that represents the part of the working
key dedicated to obfuscating this constant. As a result, the same
constant value is coded in different ways based on the value of the
locking key, preventing the attacker from recovering the sensitive
information by comparing different versions of the design.
Example. Consider a constantV pi = 10 to be stored using 5 bits
(5’b01010). The same value can be obfuscated as V ei = 5’b10111
or V ei = 5’b01101 based on locking keys Ki = 5’b11101 and
Ki = 5’b00111, respectively. The correct signal is obtained by
combining the obfuscated values V ei with the input key bits:
V
p
i = V
e
i ⊕ Ki (3)
Instead, if a wrong key is provided, the resulting value will be
different from the one contained in the initial specification, but an
attacker cannot determine this. Evenwhen the constant represents a
loop bound, the exact number of execution clock cycles for complex
specifications is unknown to the attacker.
1a basic block is a sequence of instructions with a single entry point and a single exit
point.
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if (a > b) {
   // go to BB2
}
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Figure 3: Obfuscation of control branches. Different ver-
sions are obtained by combining the test with the assigned
key bit, thwarting identification of the correct true and
false blocks.
3.3.3 Masking Control Branches. Each branch in the CFG is
reproduced in the function to determine the next state in the corre-
sponding FSM. This depends upon a condition which is the result
of a test (e.g., an arithmetic comparison or a Boolean operation)
evaluated in the data path (either true or false). TAO thwarts identi-
fication of the correct control flow (i.e., true and false branches)
by assigning a working key bit Kj to each branch j and changing
the corresponding test in the controller to be of the form:
test ⊕ Kj == 1′b1 (4)
Based on the key bitKj , the two branches are reordered to reproduce
the correct control flow. For instance, the true and false blocks are
swapped when Kj = 1 because the xor operation inverts the value
of the variable test. In this way, the attacker cannot determine
which is the actual true (false) block without knowing the value
of the key bit. Fig. 3 shows this transformation on a simple example.
Example. Consider the if-then statement in the black box
shown in Fig. 3. When a is greater b, the control transfers to BB2,
otherwise it transfers to BB3. After performing traditional HLS, we
obtain the controller and data path shown in the red boxes of Fig. 3.
Based on the results of the test, the next state is the first state of
BB2 or BB3. An attacker can determine which part of the algorithm
executes when the condition is true. Conversely, TAO solutions
can yield alternative versions of the controller (shown in the blue
boxes in Fig. 3). The two resulting tests are perfectly equivalent,
but the target state in case of true (false) result is different based
on the key bit. So, the attacker cannot determine which is the real
true block without knowing the correct value of the key bit. □
The same transformation applies to the test conditions of the for/
while loops because the front-end compiler translates them into
an identical form. One can obfuscate complex branch constructs
such as the switch-case by using more working key bits.
3.3.4 Rescheduling Obfuscates Resource Usage. To disguise the
arithmetic operations performed in the data path, TAO creates sev-
eral DFG variations for each basic block. TAO schedules each basic
block to determine the number and types of functional units and
registers, along with the clock cycle latency, to perform the corre-
sponding computation. This information is then used as constraints
for all variations. Algorithm 1 shows the procedure to create the
ALGORITHM 1: TAO algorithm to create DFG variants.
Procedure CreateDFGvariant(DFGi , ki )
Data: DFGi is the DFG of the basic block BBi ; ki is the key bits assigned to BBi
Result:VDFGi is the set of DFG variants associated with BBi
Var iants ← ∅
V ← ComputeKeyVariants(ki )
foreach v ∈ V do
distv ← ComputeDistance(v, ki ) // compute distance between v and
ki
DFG∗i ← CopyDFG(DFGi ) // create a copy of the current DFG
OP ← ClusterOperations(DFG∗i )
foreach op ∈ OP do
opj ← GetOperation(op, distv ) // return an operation at
distance distv mod clusters
SwapOperationTypes(op, opj ) // statistically swap the types of
the two operations
end
foreach dep ∈ DFG∗i do
depj ← GetDependence(d, distv ) // return a dependence at
distance distv
RearrangeDependence(dep, depj ) // statistically reorganize the
dependences
end
Var iants ← Var iants ∪ DFG∗i
end
return Allocation
-
-+
-
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* -
+
-+
+ *
+ *
* +
- + * -
+ * -
Merging 
Variants
Op
Variant
Dep
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1 2
3
Figure 4: Generation of DFG variants in TAO.
setVariants of DFG variations starting from a valid schedule DFGi
and the key bits assigned to the basic block. Fig. 4 shows the applica-
tion of this algorithm to a simple example. First, TAO produces the
2Bi−1 key variants beginning from the allocated key bits ki . Then,
TAO produces a copy of the current schedule, topologically orders
the operations and clusters them based on the operation types. For
each operation, TAO determines a reciprocal one in an alternative
cluster, and swaps the two operation types with a probability of 0.5
(step 1 in Fig. 4). For every DFG edge, TAO elects an alternative
edge, and restructures the dependencies to return a credible DFG
(step 2 in Fig. 4). TAO combines all these solutions into a single
data path microarchitecture and restructures the interconnections
using extra multiplexers and control signals (step 3 in Fig. 4). In
each clock cycle, the functionality to execute is selected through
a combination of key bits (to select the variant) and scheduling
information (to select the operations).
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Figure 5: Keymanagement when working key is larger than
the locking key (W > K). The key is generated at power up
and AES decrypts the values in the non-volatile memory.
3.4 Key Management
One feature of TAO is to take care of the locking key, i.e., how one
delivers it to the IC and generates the working key. The locking key
is stored in a tamper-proof memory (e.g., EEPROM or Non-Volatile
Memory [3]) after IC fabrication [13, 14]. The technology defines
the number of locking key bits that one can deliver to the IC. The
working key has, instead, an arbitrary size because it depends on
the complexity of the algorithm and protection (i.e., number and
size of the basic blocks, the number of control branches, and the
number of constants).
When we have to derive many working key bits from a smaller
number of locking key bits, one solution entails reusing the locking
key bits as many times as needed to generate the working key. In
this situation, each key bit has a maximum fan-out of f = ⌈W /K⌉,
which may compromise the security of the generated IC for large
values of f . If the attacker can extract one working key bit, the
corresponding locking key bit and all its replicas can be extracted.
TAO proposes an alternative solution shown in Fig. 5. TAO uses
the locking key as an AES key to encrypt the working key at design
time. Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) in the IC stores the resulting
values. At power-up, the values in the NVM are decrypted using
the given locking key and loaded into the working-key registers.
This solution leverages the security guarantees of a 256-bit AES by
using a 256-bit locking key to secure the working key bits.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To validate our approach, we extended Bambu (ver. 0.9.5) [12], an
open-source HLS framework. The modular organization of Bambu
enabled us to implement TAO as additional steps in the HLS flow.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We use TAO-enhanced Bambu to generate obfuscated circuits on
five benchmarks from a range of application domains: gsm is a
linear predictive coding analysis for telecommunication. adpcm
is an algorithm for adaptive differential pulse code modulation,
sobel is an image-processing algorithm. backprop is a method for
training neural networks, and viterbi is a dynamic programming
method for computing probabilities on a Hidden Markov model.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the benchmarks. For each
benchmark, we report the number of constants (# Const), basic
blocks (# BB), and control branches (# CJMP) following the compiler
optimizations. Together with the number of lines of C code (# C
Table 1: Characteristics of the benchmarks.
Benchmark #
C lines
#
Const
#
BB
#
CJMP
W
(bits)
gsm 110 4 88 4 484
adpcm 412 5 100 5 565
sobel 65 2 11 2 110
backprop 264 12 123 11 887
viterbi 144 117 98 9 4,145
+1% +0% +2% +0% +1%
+4% +6% +5%
+11%
+20%+18%
+23%
+11%
+31%
+25%
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Figure 6: Area overhead of TAO obfuscations.
lines), they capture the algorithm complexity. These benchmarks
are bigger than those used to report logic obfuscation. Working at
a higher abstraction allows us to obfuscate larger circuits.
We set the bit-width of each obfuscated constant to 32 bits (i.e.,
C = 32), while the original constants range between 8 (char values)
and 32 bits (int values). We assign one bit to each control branch.
Finally, we assign four bits to each basic block to generate up to 16
DFG variants (i.e., Bi = 4 for all basic blocks) Table 1 reports the
working key bits required for each algorithm (W). We use a 256-bit
locking key in all experiments.
To evaluate TAO, we used Bambu HLS targeting the Synopsys
SAED 32nm Generic Library at 500 MHz. We synthesized the base-
line and obfuscated versions of the circuits using Synopsys Design
Compiler J-2014.09-SP2. Bambu generates RTL testbenches to vali-
date the circuit for a series of input values through RTL simulations.
These executions are compared against the respective executions
of the input specification in software. We extended the testbenches
generated by Bambu to specify different locking keys as input and
to verify the implementation for each of them. Simulations are
performed with Mentor ModelSim SE 10.3 and are instrumented to
report if the execution is correct and the number of cycles.
4.2 Overhead
To evaluate the impact of each obfuscation, we modified Bambu to
select the methods to apply through command-line options. Since
these transformations are orthogonal, we generated different ob-
fuscated versions of the circuits by selectively invoking them. We
performed RTL simulations to check the latency regarding clock
cycles. When the correct key is applied, there is no performance
overhead on the generated designs concerning the baseline versions.
However, the target frequency is decreased by 8% on average when
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we create DFG variants in the data path because of the additional
multiplexers. Also, the drop off in frequency is proportional to the
number of key bits assigned to each basic block because creating
more variants requires more multiplexers. Obfuscating the control
branches has a negligible impact on the frequency (less than 1%).
Representing the constants by a pre-defined number of bits C in-
creases the size of multiplexers, minimally changing the critical
path (around 4%). This is proportional to the difference from the
actual bits needed to represent the constants.
We performed logic synthesis on the circuits to evaluate the
area overhead of the various obfuscations. Fig. 6 shows the results,
where each value is normalized against the area of the respective
baseline version. The results indicate that obfuscating the control
branches has practically no area impact. This technique only adds
a few exclusive-or gates to the controller. Obfuscating constants
increases the area by 10% on average since it creates larger mul-
tiplexers and prevents logic-level optimizations. The creation of
DFG variants has the most impact, increasing the area by around
21% on average. This area overhead is mainly due to the additional
multiplexers to connect functional units and registers. This obfus-
cation is appropriate for benchmarks where the computational part
has simple functional units (e.g., shifters and Boolean operations)
or has many basic blocks. backprop is the benchmark with more
basic blocks and has the largest overhead (>30%). Similarly to the
frequency, the area overhead is proportional to the number of key
bits assigned to the basic blocks.
We evaluated the overhead of the two key management solu-
tions offered in Section 3.4. In the basic approach of replicating the
key bits, there is no performance or area overhead. The signals are
coming from the tamper-proof memory where the locking key is
stored and directly connects to the points where one uses the work-
ing key. For the AES-based solution, there are two contributions
to the area overhead: one part is the AES decryption module, and
the other one is the NVM used to store the encrypted key bits and
the flip-flops to save the decrypted values. The first contribution is
fixed and depends on the AES implementation. The second contri-
bution is proportional to the number of working key bits. Since key
decryption is performed only once at power-up, the performance
overhead is unimportant once the chip is ready to use.
4.3 Validation of Obfuscation Results
For each benchmark, we randomly generated 100 256-bit locking
keys. One key is supplied as input for TAO, while we tested the secu-
rity level of the created circuit with the others. First, we simulated
the generated circuits with the correct locking key corroborating
that the circuits produce the correct results. All other keys result
in wrong results and this assures that the attacker cannot turn on
the circuit with another key. More explicitly, we tested the “output
corruptibility” of each locked circuit, computed as the Hamming dis-
tance with respect to the output of the baseline circuit [18]. When
combined, the three obfuscation techniques produce an average
HD of 62.2% over the five benchmarks. Also, incorrect locking keys
impact the performance only when they modify the loop bounds.
Other constants have no effect, while data path obfuscation works
on a valid schedule without altering the total number of cycles. It is
difficult for an attacker to tell whether a circuit is behaving properly
or not. While the alternative DFGs are conceptually similar to the
creation of the Super CDFG in [13], constants and control branches
cannot be weakened even with SAT-based attacks. This is because
the oracle chip is unavailable in the untrusted foundry threat model.
Moreover, the information is fully cut out from the data path and
the controller, and one cannot recover it without the correct locking
key. The circuits generated by TAO have a higher security level
than previous obfuscation techniques at the logic level.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
TAO is a comprehensive solution for algorithmic obfuscation during
high-level synthesis. This approach starts from a high-level descrip-
tion of the algorithm and creates a version of the corresponding IC
by masking all relevant details through an input locking key. TAO
presents a collection of techniques for obfuscating constant val-
ues, arithmetic operations, and control branches. TAO implements
this comprehensive solution within a state-of-the-art HLS tool and
validated on a set of representative benchmarks. These techniques
do not incur performance overhead and have an area overhead of
around 20% on average.
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